Event, weak pedagogy, and shattered love in John Williams' Stoner by Dunne, Éamonn
JOMEC Journal
Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies
Event, Weak Pedagogy, and Shattered Love
in John Williams’   
Trinity College Dublin
Email: edunne6@tcd.ie
Éamonn Dunne
Keywords 
Jacques Derrida
John D. Caputo
Weak Pedagogy
Hospitality 
   
 
 
Published by Cardiff University Press
Stoner
!
!
 http://cf.ac.uk/jomecjournal      @JOMECjournal 
Abstract 
 
What do we mean when we talk about events? Can we even (really) say we know what an 
‘event’ is? To begin thinking about teaching in terms of the event is to begin thinking 
about all of those things that happen in our classrooms that we don’t and can’t control. 
Thinking the event means thinking about the unthinkable, the unforeseeable and 
ultimately the unknowable. It is about letting go of a concept – almost impossible to 
relinquish – that teaching and learning are transparent entities: understandable, limitable, 
predictable, something we can and do know about. Thinking about the event is thinking 
about what actually happens, not what we think should or ought to happen in our 
classrooms.  
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‘I don’t know’, je ne sais pas, signals a 
situation. In what I have elsewhere called 
its restance, remnance, the poem always 
speaks beyond knowledge, au-delà du 
savoir. It writes, and what it writes is, first 
of all, this very fact, that it is addressed 
and destined beyond knowledge. 
 – Jacques Derrida 
 
Penguin Books have recently been 
releasing a beautiful little series of 
pocket books designed to get you 
thinking as you make your commute to 
and from work. These little portable 
distractions appear in an elegant series 
called Philosophy in Transit. They are 
bitesize, commuter-friendly books 
written in an accessible and easy style 
by top contemporary philosophers. 
Slavoj Žižek’s contribution is entitled 
Event and meanders through that theme 
in a delightful manner in a series of six 
short chapters referred to as ‘stops’. As 
expected Žižek is witty and surprising 
along the way, combining incisive 
political critique with sparkling 
philosophical aphorisms, pop-cultural 
icons, sporting heroes and a thrilling 
smatter of lurid quips and quirky 
anecdotes. Effectively, what you get in 
Event is an introduction to what Žižek 
calls the ‘conundrum of definition’ and 
the ‘illimitable risk’ of event by way of 
Buddha, Hegel, film noir, bucketloads of 
excrement, Kierkegaard, Freud, Brittany 
Spears’ vagina, and of course the 
compulsory Lacanian forays into the 
imaginary, the symbolic and the real.  
 
The blurb on the back, however, is what 
interest me here and I will use this to 
open up a conversation about event as a 
quasi-concept in philosophy (by way of 
Jack Caputo) and literature (by way of 
John Williams’ stunning novel Stoner). I’m 
calling this a ‘quasi-concept’ (or ‘non-
concept’) in order to immediately draw 
attention, not only to the difficulty of its 
definition, which is unquestionably mired 
in mist and fog, but also to the possibility 
that we might actually be wrong about it 
from the very beginning; and that might 
be really, honestly, all we can say about 
it. Whatever it is we may think we know 
about this topic becomes questionable 
from the moment we investigate it. If 
there is one thing the philosophers have 
taught us about this topic it is that with 
this we are all borne back ceaselessly 
into a past that offers us little respite, 
little sanctuary, and little real 
understanding. The more we beat against 
it, the more it pushes us back. A little bit 
like St. Augustine’s take on the problem 
of time, we all seem to know exactly 
what an event is until someone asks us 
to explain it. Then we get stuck. The 
blurb on Event reads as follows: What is 
really happening when something 
happens?  
 
In the second in a new series of 
accessible, commute-length books of 
original thought, Slavoj Žižek, one of the 
world’s greatest living philosophers, 
examines the new and highly-contested 
concept of event. 
 
If you think about this for a moment, 
there are at least two things wrong with 
this statement. The first is that the 
concept of event is not new; in fact it is 
anything but new. In recent philosophy 
alone its insistence is keenly felt in the 
likes of Alain Badiou, Maurice Blanchot, 
Michel Foucault, Giles Deleuze, 
Emmanuel Lévinas, Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Henri Maldiney, Claude Romano, and 
Jacques Derrida to speak only of a few 
key figures. Before those key figures one 
would have to include Nietzsche 
(especially his fröhliche Wissenschaft and 
Zarathustra), Heidegger (on Ereignis for 
instance), Kierkegaard (on irony), 
Augustine, Aristotle, Plato, Heraclitus and 
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so on and so forth. So the concept of 
event is not new. Not by a long shot.  
 
The second problem with the blurb is, as 
I’ve intimated, that the event is not a 
concept. Events, in fact, worry 
conception. Events do not settle into 
ideas about events; they actually alert us 
to our inability to settle into ideas about 
events, to rest or keep stationary the 
consciousness of things, to conceive the 
self-same, the thing-in-itself (das Ding an 
sich). Events cannot be bracketed in the 
Epoché of phenomenological reduction 
or siphoned off into a corner of 
consciousness. Žižek’s way of putting this 
problem in his little book is by way of 
one of Maurice Blanchot’s self-interviews:  
 
Question: ‘Will you admit this fact, 
that we are at a turning point’? 
Answer: ‘If it’s a fact it’s not a 
turning point’. (Žižek 2014) 
 
Meaning that a turning point (an event) 
changes the very parameters around 
which we measure facts. The event, in 
fact, changes the entire field in which 
facts appear and disappear. It’s really 
this latter point that concerns me in my 
own thinking of the event and specifically 
in my own teaching where the thinking 
of the event is pervasive, invasive – and I 
mean ‘invasive’ in its etymological sense 
as a troubling factor, an attack or 
invasion of the senses, giving rise to what 
Deborah Britzman would call ‘difficult 
knowledge’.  
  
Given the entire history of thinking in this 
area I can only limit myself here to what 
Jack Caputo has been saying about the 
event and argue why I think this is 
quintessential for a productive rethinking 
of present circumstances in pedagogical 
theory and practice, especially since 
current neoliberal agendas have given 
rise to an unprecedented managerialism 
in the guise of benchmarking, research 
frameworks, hyperstructuring and 
targeted outcomes within our schools 
and universities. What concerns me now 
is how Caputo has been speaking of the 
event as a peculiar pedagogical 
predicament. So my leading question is 
why is the event consistently a 
pedagogical dilemma? Why does Caputo 
keep coming back to teaching? God 
teaching St. Paul (by pushing him off his 
horse), Jesus teaching his disciples, 
Derrida teaching Caputo, Caputo 
teaching his own classes. Why always, 
always already, does Caputo infer that 
the question of the event, precisely what 
happens, and we remember Derrida says 
‘Deconstruction is what happens’ (C’est 
qui arrive) – which is the event: 
deconstruction is an event, a gesture 
towards the im-possible – why always 
does it come back, detour after detour, 
counterpath after counterpath, to the 
question of what happens when we 
teach or think about teaching? In a 
roundabout way, that’s my question. Why 
is thinking the event thinking teaching? 
 
Since I teach literature most of the time 
and think through literature, through 
stories, poems and plays, my hypothesis 
is that the best way to see how events 
take place (replace or displace) us in 
teaching and reading is through narrative 
examples. If you really think about what 
happens in a classroom when you teach 
literature it’s never really about learning 
outcomes, trajectories, subject planning, 
goals or objectives or, however 
ludicrously, even understanding or 
knowledge. This is why Aristotle’s 
phronesis, for instance, is so important. 
To presume to know what your students 
are getting out of the promissory note of 
education can be murderous, Avital 
Ronell avers (Ronell 2004: 63). This 
despite the ubiquitous neo-liberalist 
logic of late capitalism: that students are 
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consumers and teachers are producers. 
This logic, perniciously claiming the 
working lives of teachers in second and 
third level institutions around the world, 
is what Gert Biesta, in a nod to Jacques 
Rancière, calls the ‘learnification’ of 
education (Biesta 2012: 35-49).  
 
If you really think about it, just for a 
moment, an Augenblick, and before it’s 
gone again, what becomes important in 
literature classes is not knowing the 
learning outcome, not knowing where 
you’re headed, not knowing why or how 
what you’re reading or teaching is 
important. Not knowing the importance, 
in point of fact, is what’s important – the 
inutility of it all, the in-essential, the 
destinerrance of it all. If we knew where 
reading and teaching a specific text 
would lead us then it wouldn’t be worth 
the trek. In Benjamin’s surprising 
formulation: ‘Methode ist Umweg’, a 
digression, a wandering, Holzwege.   
 
As my example of why this is always the 
case, I’ll take John William’s astonishing 
novel Stoner, which The Sunday Times 
enticingly describes as ‘The greatest 
novel you’ve never read’. I’ll argue that 
Stoner is a brilliant exemplification of 
how teaching as event might be 
imagined (im-possibly) in fictional 
discourse and that that novel is a literary 
dramatisation of the arguments Caputo 
and contemporary philosophy on the 
event have passionately, knowingly or 
unknowingly envisioned. So let’s start 
with Caputo.  
 
Here’s Caputo’s understanding of the 
event – in five easy pieces: 
 
1. ‘An event is not precisely what 
happens, which is what the word 
suggests in English, but something 
going on in what happens... it is not 
something present, but something 
seeking to make itself felt in what 
is present’. 
 
2. ‘Accordingly, I would distinguish 
between a name and the event 
that is astir or that transpires in a 
name. The name is a kind of 
provisional formulation of an event, 
a relatively stable if evolving 
structure, while the event is ever 
restless’. 
 
3. ‘An event is not a thing but 
something astir in a thing’. 
 
4. ‘Words and things are 
deconstructible, but events, if there 
are any such things, are not 
deconstructible’. 
 
5. ‘In terms of temporality, events, 
never being present, solicit us from 
afar, draw us on, draw us out into 
the future, calling us hither. Events 
are provocations and promises, 
and they have the structure of 
what Derrida calls the 
unforeseeable ‘to come’ (à venir)’. 
(Caputo 2007: 47-48) 
 
In more recent books like The Prayers 
and Tears of Jacques Derrida, The 
Weakness of God and The Insistence of 
God Caputo continually refines his 
position on the event. But more often 
than not what gives itself over in his 
repetitions is a resonance of the miracle 
of iterability – the other in (insisting in) 
the repetition of the same.   
 
‘Education’, says Caputo, ‘is an event’. If 
you are to take him at his word then this 
name harbours something within it, a 
desire for some other, for some-thing 
otherwise than being and beyond 
essence. Education, like love, the gift, 
justice, responsibility, is a quasi-
transcendental in the Capution universe, 
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a provocation to thinking, even an 
incitement to riot. What often gets lost in 
this word, as what often gets lost in the 
God of onto-theology, is Augustine’s 
question: ‘Quid ergo amo, cum deum 
meum amo’? [What do I love when I love 
my God?]. How easy to transfer this over 
to the most pertinent question for us 
today? ‘What do I love when I love 
education’?  
 
For Caputo, the answer to that question 
is that we are in love with the weak force 
of a promise. The promise ‘to come’, that 
something might come, something that 
we can’t foresee. It is what is going on in 
the classroom, not what we think ought 
to be happening or even what we think is 
happening that’s important. Education is 
therefore like ‘a desire beyond desire’, a 
desire that we don’t fully understand, nor 
should we even. Education is haunted by 
the promise not of the ‘future-present’ 
but of an ‘absolute future’, the future that 
we cannot plan (Caputo 2012: 23-34). 
That’s what scares most of us, and it 
should, Caputo claims, because if you 
don’t know what’s coming around the 
corner then you can’t protect yourself 
against it. This is precisely where 
hospitality comes into the equation and 
democracy. For both Derrida and Caputo 
the promise of democracy is ‘a weak 
imperative’, a work in progress, a desire 
within a desire, something we just can’t 
know and it’s this nonknowledge that 
scares educators the most. But, of 
course, you just can’t say this to 
educators without risking something – 
like your job, your credibility, your career! 
Says Caputo in the opening interview of 
this issue: 
   
But, the truth is that we serve the event, 
are in bonds to the event, and we are 
not a ‘master’, just as we are not a 
‘doctor’ of the event but a patient. But 
confessing such non-agency, receptivity 
and non-knowing is not a recommended 
course at a job interview or a conference 
presentation and it is not a path to 
tenure. At such times we are expected to 
be upright bodies not beings of flesh. The 
best advice I can give you on this point is 
this. For a long time, at least, this 
confession may be permitted only as an 
aside (an apostrophe) when for a 
moment, an Augenblick, in the midst of a 
lecture or a dialogue one notes, by the 
way, just in passing, as if this were not a 
serious point, almost as if we were joking 
(the comic as the incognito of the 
religious), that none of us know who we 
are. Then we get back to ‘business’. (See 
page 15, this issue) 
 
Caputo’s claim is not that educators 
ought to acknowledge the limitations of 
what they can and cannot do, but that 
they actually need to become aware that 
what they do is unthinkable, even 
impossible, as Freud suggested before 
him (Britzman 2010). Perhaps, and it is 
always a question of perhaps for Caputo 
– his clever pun, as we’ve seen, is Peut-
être against l’être (being against ‘may-
being’) – there can be a new 
metapedagogics of failure and non-
knowing to springboard effective, 
alternative, radically underexplored kinds 
of learning: ‘The teacher must figure out 
how to be a weak force, how the middle 
voice works, how to be an agent without 
agency, a provocateur who is not an 
agent, how to engage the spooky 
dynamics of a haunting spirit’ (Caputo 
2012: 27).  
 
If the teacher is not a master then what 
is she? To summarize a little then, 
Caputo’s argument is that good teachers 
are conjurers, magicians, and people 
with the uncanny ability to let thinking 
happen, to let events take place. They 
are people who welcome the event by 
saying come, veni foras, or oui oui. ‘To 
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learn’, says Caputo, ‘is to unlearn what 
we think we know and expose ourselves 
to the unknowable. Teaching and 
learning alike are a matter of allowing 
ourselves to be spooked’ (2012: 34).  
 
The art of good teaching is not about 
becoming a master but much more 
radically about unbecoming one, 
unbecoming one-self, becoming 
ignorant, unlearning. You have to give 
yourself over to the possibility, as 
impossible as it may sound, to being 
spooked into an educational experience, 
to being haunted by the ghost of a 
chance of getting it right, to seeing it 
right even, perhaps especially, if that 
seeing it right means getting it wrong. We 
educators must learn to say ‘stay, speak, 
I charge thee’ to the spirit of education, 
the spirit that comes unannounced and 
seeks an impossible hospitality.   
 
   
Stoner’s Love 
 
I’ll return to questions of unlearning and 
weakness in due course, but I turn first 
to a single moment in John Williams’ 
1965 novel Stoner under the auspices of 
this leading idea. The novel is 
experiencing something of a rebirth at 
the moment and has very recently found 
a considerable readership, becoming a 
bestseller across Europe fifty years after 
its initial publication.  
 
First published in England in 1972, the 
novel quickly went out of print after a 
poor run; and this despite C. P. Snow’s 
glowing review and repeated refrain in 
The Financial Times, ‘Why isn’t this novel 
a classic’? The novel was simply forgotten 
for over thirty years. It wasn’t until 2003 
that it reappeared as a Vintage Classic in 
England with a fine introduction by John 
McGahern and became a New York 
Review of Books Classic in 2006. The 
novel begins with the wonderfully 
pointed and concise rendition of a life 
lived in an academic world that really 
neither cared for nor wanted the 
eponymous William Stoner. In just over 
one paragraph on the opening page the 
entire story is really summed up:  
 
William Stoner entered the 
University of Missouri as a 
freshman in the year 1910, at the 
age of eighteen. Eight years later, 
during the height of World War I, 
he received his Doctor of 
Philosophy degree and accepted 
an instructorship at the same 
university, where he taught until 
his death in 1956. He did not rise 
above the rank of assistant 
professor, and few students 
remembered him with any 
sharpness after they had taken his 
courses. When he died his 
colleagues made a memorial 
contribution of a medieval manu-
script to the University library. The 
manuscript may still be found in 
the Rare Books Collection, bearing 
the inscription: ‘Presented to the 
Library of the University of 
Missouri, in memory of William 
Stoner, Department of English. By 
his colleagues’.  
 
An occasional student who comes 
upon the name may wonder idly 
who William Stoner was, but he 
seldom pursues his curiosity 
beyond a casual question. 
(Williams 2012: 3)  
 
 
In superb limpid prose Williams 
chronicles the life of William Stoner from 
humble beginnings on a farmland in the 
remote Missouri, through his 
undergraduate, graduate and teaching 
career, through an unhappy marriage, his 
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failure as a father, a brief love affair and 
finally a muted death. 
 
Later when Stoner first arrives at the 
university he begins a course of study in 
the School of Agriculture but must also 
take a survey course in English literature. 
Difficulties immediately arise for the 
young student as he finds this course 
remarkably different from his other 
studies. He describes these as disturbing 
and disquieting in an inexpressible way. 
There follows one of two astonishing 
moments in the novel where the 
subjects of teaching and learning are 
handled with remarkable sensitivity and 
depth. 
 
Here’s what we know of Stoner’s 
touching moment: Stoner sits and listens 
to his professor as he recites 
Shakespeare’s sonnet 73: ‘that time of 
year thou mayest in me behold’ and is 
awe-struck. He listens and watches his 
professor read it from his textbook. Then 
his teacher drops the book and recites 
from memory:  
 
In me thou see’st the glowing of 
such fire,  
That on the ashes of his youth 
doth lie,  
As the death-bed whereon it must 
expire,  
Consumed with that which it was 
nourished by.  
This thou perceivest, which makes 
thy love more strong,  
To love that well which thou must 
leave ere long 
 
The professor directs a question directly 
at Stoner: ‘what does this sonnet mean?’ 
Stoner draws a blank. ‘Shakespeare 
speaks to you across three hundred 
years, Mr Stoner; Do you hear him’? 
Unable to speak, Stoner mutters: ‘It 
means’. He then repeats this: ‘It means’. 
The moment is simultaneously traumatic 
and exquisite. 
 
Stoner’s response is obviously a failure. 
But it seems the most honest. His failure, 
ignorance, and the traumatic moment of 
his unknowing, of his forgetting, conclude 
in an awareness that he cannot even 
express to himself or to us. It’s that 
moment that is most life-changing for 
Stoner and, by extension, the close 
reader of this novel.  
 
 
Un-learning 
 
If, as McGahern argued, this novel is a 
novel about love, then it is a novel about 
the love of unlearning, of touching a void 
or vacuum where meaning is hollowed 
out and where the yearning for meaning 
meets the love of learning, where an-
other kind of learning is espoused, the 
kind of learning that encounters in the 
alterity of meaning the announcement of 
an-other learning, a learning without 
learning, a prosthesis of knowing. 
 
In reading literature up to this point 
Stoner has been struck by the absolute 
inutility of it all: ‘He read and reread his 
literature assignments so frequently that 
his work in other courses began to 
suffer; and still the words he read were 
words on pages, and he could not see 
the use of what he did’ (9). Behind ‘their 
flat, dry meaning’, Stoner hopes to find a 
‘clue’ to allow him to unravel the mystery 
of meaning, to unlock the hermeneutic 
ideal, the one Truth. He longs for the 
moment of epiphany when he can find 
the use for what he is doing, when he 
can effectively look behind the words 
and discover some transcendental 
signified, some ur-referent about which 
his learning is directed. Stoner’s belief is 
that this can in some way be taught. That 
he is missing, in his lectures, up to this 
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point an instruction. He is searching for a 
reassurance that there is some 
underlying rationale to be found beneath 
the veil.   
 
It’s an effect of language, says Foucault 
echoing Nietzsche, that it gives rise to a 
dual suspicion. On the one hand we are 
suspicious that there is an underlying 
truth behind appearances, that we 
merely lack the interpretive apparatus to 
see it. ‘Language doesn’t say exactly what 
it says [le langage ne dit pas exactement 
ce qu'il dit], so we are often wary that we 
are missing some underlying sense’. This 
is not a new insight, the Greeks referred 
to this dyad as allegoria and hyponoia. 
The title of Paul de Man’s great work on 
close reading, for example, Allegories of 
Reading, is an exemplary extended 
meditation on this point and what he 
calls language’s ‘aberrancy’. On the other 
hand, there is the effect of language that 
overflows itself; the contention that 
language is more than simply verbal 
expression and that it hyperbolically 
exists in non-linguistic forms: ‘it might be 
that nature, the sea, rustling trees, 
animals, faces, masks, crossed swords all 
speak’ (Foucault 1989: 59).  
 
Indeed, but why should we stop there? 
The list of course is interminable, for the 
question of reading, like language, can’t 
be closed off all that simply. Interpreting 
two magpies as good luck may be a 
superstition that is easily identifiable as 
such, but acknowledging that we are 
inevitably prey to imposing on the faces 
of those we meet in public the private 
narratives of our own suspicions is more 
difficult to inculcate. Or, for present 
purposes, that it is impossible for us not 
to read into the descriptions of Williams’ 
characters (despite the ‘Plain Style’) their 
unrepresented, unrepresentable, deeper 
psychological sentiments, intuitions and 
motivations. Seeing this, as we may 
occasionally do, enables a reading that is 
more attuned to the dangers implied by 
Foucault’s speculation than mere 
acceptance. That is, it’s all too easy to 
accept the difference and forget about it, 
but it is a central question that Stoner 
throws into the light of day both 
stylistically and thematically. 
 
Such is the case with Stoner’s splendid 
misreading of Edith, whose initial 
personal disclosure (her ‘plea for help’) of 
her stilted formal education, unloving 
parents and sterile adolescence, 
strangely preempts his love for her. 
Novels invariably represent scenes of 
falling in love hyperbolically. It’s a trait we 
are used to, but one that keeps readers 
alive, delighted and enthralled 
nonetheless. Though we read Lawrence’s 
extensive sentimentalizing and are aware 
of its mawkishness we are still drawn in 
by what F. R. Leavis was wont to call its 
‘vitality’.  
 
It is the power of love to bring us deeper 
into the richness of a narrative, even if 
that richness is poorly constructed or 
overwritten. In the case of Stoner, 
however, that moment is bizarrely 
rendered, almost reversed, to the point 
that the reader is left wondering how and 
why that love has come about at all. 
Edith’s personal disclosure is mechanical 
and functional. We are told that Stoner’s 
awkward attempts to engage her in 
phatic conversation have failed and that 
he is getting up to leave, whereupon 
Edith delivers the story of her life in 
sentences that run on interminably 
‘without inflection’. Stoner’s recollection 
is that during the hour and a half they 
spend together that December night 
Edith tells him more about herself than 
she ever will again. ‘And when it was 
over, he felt that they were strangers in a 
way that he had not thought they would 
be, and he knew that he was in love’ (53). 
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It is precisely because Stoner does not 
understand that he falls in love with 
Edith. This is a salutary moment for 
teachers who view love as their calling, 
for Stoner’s love is not returned. Though 
they marry, his misreading of Edith’s plea 
is wildly mistaken. Ironically, he falls in 
love with a stranger who will remain a 
stranger. The hospitality he shows to his 
beloved in falling in love transforms him 
into a host for a parasite. He falls into the 
unknown and is captured by it, 
enraptured and ensnared. In a way his 
blindness, his failure to understand that 
not understanding is not always a benign 
occurrence, unlike his failure to 
understand literature (which becomes 
his love for literature), results in his 
catastrophic marriage. 
 
 
Weak Teaching 
 
What do we learn about teaching from 
reading Stoner? Williams spoke about 
the novel as an exercise in trying to 
come to terms with teaching, of figuring 
out how to do it effectively (Woolley 
1986). In the novel’s purview teaching is 
a queer thing, in the sense that it has to 
do with something beyond knowing what 
one is doing. There is a sense of the job 
of teaching, which is the sense Stoner 
has, of the ‘tradition’, but there is also the 
love of the thing: ‘It all grows out of the 
love of the thing. The lack of love defines 
a bad teacher’ (Woolley 1986). Saying 
that effective teaching is love is a little 
like Caputo’s little apostrophe: you don’t 
say that in a job interview! ‘Why do you 
want to teach’? Should not be followed 
with the answer ‘I’m in love’. You should 
just get down to ‘business’. You should 
know the programme, the task at hand, 
the learning outcomes, the key 
objectives, the intstrumentalist jargon. 
Just teach the curriculum! And yet, as 
Nancy puts it in his most eloquent 
discourse on the subject, ‘Philosophy 
never arrives at this thinking – that 
“thinking is love”, even though it is 
inscribed at the head of its program, or 
as the general epigraph to all its 
treatises’ (Nancy 1991: 86). If we accept 
this treatise, then we must reconsider 
that the task inscribed in the philosophy 
of teaching is the thinking of love, of 
what it is to love one’s task. At the heart 
of teaching is weak thinking, a 
subjunctive mood: what do I love when I 
love my teaching? What do I love when I 
love learning? What is my pact with the 
impossible? Would it be possible to even 
think love as a response to this 
predicament of understanding? It is weak 
because it cannot answer these 
questions. 
 
To this failure I add the love of 
unlearning as a peripheral, perverse 
aspect of all pertinent acknowledgement, 
a quasi-spectral hermeneutics, a 
hermeneutics of the a-venir, of the 
coming future possibilities of teaching 
and learning that cannot be adequately 
envisioned by arming-up with curricula, 
with professional competencies, with 
learning outcomes, with projections and 
the disingenuous market jargon of 
instrumentalism and agenda. ‘Learning 
starts with unlearning [Entlernen]’, as 
Werner Hamacher points out. ‘We gather 
“around” the suspension of all 
knowledge, ability and action. It is only 
this “suspension” which is between us, 
and out of which we become we’ 
(Hamacher 2004: 171). Perhaps, and it is 
always a question of perhaps when it 
comes to weak teaching, weak thinking, 
weak reading, there is a realm of non-
knowledge from which the logician is 
banished. Perhaps, this dangerous 
perhaps, can lead us beyond thinking 
like a pedant and proclaiming the 
Enlightenment again and again without 
asking why. Perhaps it can teach us that 
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thinking is love, that being suspended by 
or in the event of learning is what really 
matters. What really matters is astir in 
the event. Learning, we could say, 
‘belongs to the sphere of invitation, of 
invocation, to the poetics of 
proclamation, of kerygma’ (Caputo 2006: 
16). It belongs without belonging to the 
event of unlearning, which is miraculous. 
Teaching, like reading, is always a 
profession of faith. It is impossible. It’s a 
vocation for lovers of the impossible.  
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